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Abstract44 
Background: Dietary sugar, especially in liquid form, increases risk of dental caries, adiposity and45 
type 2 diabetes. The UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) was announced in March 2016 and 46 
implemented in April 2018 and charges manufacturers and importers at £0.24 per litre for drinks 47 
with over 8g sugar per 100ml (high levy category), £0.18 per litre for drinks with 5 to 8g sugar per 48 
100ml (low levy category) and no charge for drinks with less than 5g sugar per 100ml (no levy 49 
category). Fruit juices and milk-based drinks are exempt. We measured the impact of the SDIL on 50 
price, product size, number of soft drinks on the marketplace, and the proportion of drinks over the 51 
lower levy threshold of 5g sugar per 100ml.  52 
Methods and Findings: We analysed data on a total of 209,637 observations of soft drinks over 85 53 
time points between September 2015 and February 2019, collected from the websites of the leading 54 
supermarkets in the UK. The dataset was structured as a repeat cross-sectional study. We used 55 
controlled interrupted time series to assess the impact of the SDIL on changes in level and slope for 56 
the four outcome variables. Equivalent models were run for potentially levy-eligible drink categories 57 
(‘intervention’ drinks) and levy-exempt fruit juices and milk-based drinks (‘control’ drinks). Observed 58 
results were compared with counterfactual scenarios based on extrapolation of pre-SDIL trends.  59 
We found that in February 2019, the proportion of intervention drinks over the lower levy sugar 60 
threshold had fallen by 33.8 percentage points (95% confidence intervals: 33.3, 34.4, p < 0.001). The 61 
price of intervention drinks in the high levy category had risen by £0.075 (£0.037, £0.115, p < 0.001) 62 
per litre – a 31% pass through rate – whilst prices of intervention drinks in the low levy category and 63 
no levy category had fallen and risen by smaller amounts, respectively. Whilst the product size of 64 
branded high levy and low levy drinks barely changed after implementation of the SDIL (-7ml (-23ml, 65 
11ml) and 16ml (6ml, 27ml) respectively), there were large changes to product size of own-brand 66 
drinks with an increase of 172ml (133ml, 214ml) for high levy drinks and a decrease of 141ml 67 
(111ml, 170ml) for low levy drinks. The number of available drinks that were in the high levy 68 
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category when the SDIL was announced was reduced by 3 (-6, 12) by the implementation of the 69 
SDIL. Equivalent models for control drinks provided little evidence of impact of the SDIL. These 70 
results are not sales weighted, so do not give an account of how sugar consumption from drinks may 71 
have changed over the time period. 72 
Conclusions:  The results suggest that the SDIL incentivised many manufacturers to reduce sugar in 73 
soft drinks. Some of the cost of the levy to manufacturers and importers was passed on to 74 
consumers as higher prices, but not always on targeted drinks. These changes could reduce 75 
population exposure to liquid sugars and associated health risks.  76 
Registration: ISRCTN 18042742 77 
78 
Author summary 79 
Why was this study done? 80 
 In March 2016, the UK Government announced the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) – a tax 81 
on soft drinks that contain more than 5g sugar per 100ml. Fruit juices and milk-based drinks 82 
are exempt from the levy. The stated aim of the SDIL was to encourage the soft drinks 83 
industry to improve the healthiness of the drinks they produce, by reducing sugar content or 84 
reducing portion sizes. The SDIL was implemented in April 2018. 85 
 This study measures the impact of the SDIL on the soft drinks that are available to buy in the 86 
UK, to evaluate whether the SDIL achieved its aim of influencing industry practice. 87 
What did the researchers do and find? 88 
 We used data on 209,637 observations of soft drinks available from UK supermarket 89 
websites at 85 time points between September 2015 and February 2019. 90 
 At each time point, we measured the percentage of drinks with sugar levels greater than 5g 91 
per 100ml, the price of drinks, the volume at which they are sold, and the number of 92 
different drinks available to purchase, and compared these with estimates of what would 93 
have happened if the SDIL was not introduced. 94 
 We found changes to sugar levels in drinks. The percentage of drinks with sugar over 5g per 95 
100ml fell from 49% to 15% over the time period. There was little change in the product size 96 
or the number of products available to consumers. The price of high sugar drinks increased 97 
after the implementation of the SDIL, but only by one third of the amount of the tax. 98 
What do these findings mean? 99 
5 
 The results show that the SDIL was associated with a considerable impact on the soft drinks 100 
industry, particularly with regard to the amount of sugar in soft drinks. The SDIL was not 101 
associated with a reduction in the size of the soft drinks marketplace. 102 
 These results are not weighted by sales of soft drinks, so we are not able to estimate the 103 
impact of these changes on sugar consumption. 104 
105 
106 
Introduction 107 
Free sugars have been shown to be associated with obesity and type 2 diabetes [1,2], especially 108 
when consumed in liquid form [3,4]. Consumption of sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs) increases 109 
body weight in children [5,6], and has been associated with obesity [7,8], diabetes [9,10,11], 110 
hypertension [12] and cardiovascular disease [9,13] in adults. An estimated 3.6% of diabetes cases in 111 
the UK (and 8.7% of cases in the US) are attributable to SSB consumption [14] – a condition that 112 
presently costs the National Health Service (NHS) around £10 billion a year [15].  113 
114 
In October 2015, in response to the Health Select Committee inquiry on Childhood Obesity [16], 115 
Public Health England published a report listing recommendations for reducing sugar consumption in 116 
children, including a tax on SSBs [17]. George Osborne, then Chancellor of Exchequer, announced in 117 
his budget of 16th March 2016 that the Government would introduce a UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy 118 
(SDIL) to be implemented on 6th April 2018 [18], allowing two years for manufacturers to prepare for 119 
the levy by reformulating drinks, reducing product sizes, or removing / introducing products from / 120 
to the marketplace. The SDIL is a levy on manufacturers and importers of soft drinks based on total 121 
sales of drinks aimed at influencing industry behaviour. This distinguishes it from most soft drink 122 
taxes introduced elsewhere [19], which are normally excise taxes, aimed at increasing price for the 123 
end consumer, with the intention of reducing demand for SSBs. To incentivise reformulation of sugar 124 
levels, the SDIL is a two-tiered levy: drinks over 8g of sugar per 100ml are levied at a rate of £0.24 125 
per litre (higher levy tier); between 5 and 8g of sugar per 100ml, drinks are levied at a rate of £0.18 126 
6 
per litre (lower levy tier). Drinks with less than 5g sugar per 100ml are not levied (no levy tier) [20]. 127 
Soft drinks that are 100% fruit juice, at least 75% milk (or a milk replacement), contain greater than 128 
1.2% alcohol (or are an alcoholic beverage replacement), or are produced or distributed by 129 
manufacturers and importers with UK sales less than 1 million litres per year are exempt from the 130 
SDIL, irrespective of sugar content. These rates were announced in March 2016 but not confirmed 131 
until 27th February 2017 in a pre-budget statement. A more detailed description of the policy 132 
objectives for the SDIL can be found elsewhere [21].  133 
134 
Previous evaluations of soft drink taxes have focussed on their impact on price and consumer 135 
purchasing behaviour [22,23,24,25], but have not evaluated their impact on sugar content in drinks, 136 
product sizes and product diversity within the marketplace. We hypothesised that the SDIL would 137 
have multiple impacts on the UK food and drink system [26], and here we report on the impact of 138 
the announcement (16th March 2016) and implementation (6th April 2018) of the SDIL on the 139 
proportion of soft drinks with sugar levels above levy thresholds, their price, the volume in which 140 
they are sold, and the number of soft drinks in supermarkets. We present results separately for 141 
‘branded’ and ‘own-brand’ products (here we define ‘own-brand’ products as those manufactured 142 
and branded by supermarket, and ‘branded’ products as all other drinks) as they occupy different 143 
places in the soft drinks marketplace. Consumers of own-brand products tend to be more motivated 144 
by price than by quality and perception of own-brands influence consumers’ perception of the 145 
supermarket as a whole [27-28]. Manufacturers of branded and own-brand products therefore have 146 
different motivations and could react to the SDIL differently. 147 
148 
Methods 149 
Outcome measures 150 
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Using a time-stamped dataset of observations of soft drinks available in UK supermarkets between 151 
September 2015 and February 2019, we assessed whether the announcement and implementation 152 
of the SDIL had an impact on the following measures: 153 
 The proportion of available drinks with sugar content greater than 5g per 100ml (the 154 
threshold over which the levy applies. An equivalent analysis considering the proportion of 155 
drinks with sugar content greater than or equal to 8g per 100ml – the higher levy threshold – 156 
is reported in S1 Appendix) 157 
 The mean price (£ per 100ml) of available soft drinks 158 
 The mean product size (ml) of available soft drinks 159 
 The number of soft drinks available for purchase from UK supermarkets. Here we refer to 160 
the different options available to the consumer, rather than the number of sales or the 161 
number of items available on supermarket shelves. 162 
163 
For the price, product size and product diversity analyses, we stratified our results into three groups 164 
by sugar content: less than 5g sugar per 100ml (where no levy applies); 5-<8g sugar per 100ml 165 
(where the lower levy rate applies); greater than or equal to 8g sugar per 100ml (where the higher 166 
levy rate applies). Soft drinks appearing in different product sizes or in different supermarkets were 167 
included as independent observations in the study dataset. 168 
169 
Study design 170 
We had no unique identifier for the soft drinks that were included in the analysis, and therefore we 171 
were not able to link all observations at different time points. Therefore, we were unable to create a 172 
panel series, and structured our dataset as a repeat cross-sectional design. Within this structure, we 173 
used controlled interrupted time series (CITS) analysis [29], with two intervention points: the 174 
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announcement (16th March 2016) and the implementation (6th April 2018) of the SDIL. The units of 175 
analysis for the CITS were observations of all soft drinks identified from supermarkets at 85 time 176 
points between September 2015 and February 2019 (see further below). ‘Soft drinks’ were defined 177 
as all edible liquids (either sold ready to drink or to be reconstituted from liquid concentrates) 178 
excluding soups, alcoholic beverages (and non-alcoholic versions), cow’s milk, dried drinks (e.g. 179 
milkshake powder, instant coffee), bottled water or flavourings that need the addition of water (e.g. 180 
tea bags).  181 
182 
For each of the outcome measures, we conducted separate analyses on what we have called 183 
‘intervention’ and ‘control’ drinks for brevity. ‘Intervention’ drinks consisted of all soft drinks except 184 
SDIL-exempt fruit juices and milk-based drinks. This set includes drinks that do not attract levy 185 
payments, as they have sugar levels below the minimum threshold of 5g/100ml (e.g. ‘diet’ variants 186 
of popular drink brands), but represent a category into which levy-eligible drinks might fall following 187 
reformulation. ‘Control’ drinks consist of soft drinks that were exempt from the SDIL due to being 188 
100% fruit juice, milk-based or a milk alternative (regardless of sugar content). The control series 189 
was chosen as it was assumed that trends over time in this group would not be affected by the SDIL. 190 
Demonstrating this alongside effects in the intervention series would show specificity of results, 191 
strengthening the evidence that any observed relationship is causal [29].  192 
193 
The decision regarding how to categorise soft drinks that are neither subject to exemptions, nor 194 
have sugar levels above the minimum threshold of 5g/100ml is not straightforward. These drinks are 195 
not subject to the levy, so could be regarded to be equivalent to drinks from exempt categories. 196 
However, we included such drinks in the intervention series as manufacturers could react to the SDIL 197 
by reducing sugar content of drinks, thereby moving drinks from categories that are taxed into 198 
categories that are not. If our study design included these non-taxed categories in the control series 199 
9 
then we would allow drinks to migrate from the intervention to the control series over time, which 200 
would violate our assumption that the SDIL does not affect the control series. 201 
202 
To report the impact of the SDIL on trends, we estimated counterfactual scenarios where pre-SDIL 203 
trends in the variable of interest were extrapolated to simulate the likely trajectory in the absence of 204 
the SDIL, and then we estimated the difference between the observed measures from the regression 205 
models and counterfactual scenarios at four time points: 50 days post-announcement (5th May 206 
2016); 50 days pre-implementation (15th February 2018); 50 days post-implementation (26th May 207 
2018); and the end of the current dataset (17th February 2019, which is 317 days post-208 
implementation). To estimate confidence intervals around the differences, we compared the 95% 209 
lower and higher confidence intervals from the observed results with point estimates from the 210 
counterfactual. The chosen timepoints for displaying results are arbitrary. The complete set of 211 
regression model results are provided in S2 Appendix allowing for estimation of results at any 212 
timepoint. 213 
214 
Data 215 
Fig 1 provides a data flowchart for the separate analyses described in this manuscript. We compiled 216 
data from two sources. Firstly, we used data collected from the websites of the six leading UK 217 
supermarkets (Asda, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Morrisons, Ocado and Waitrose) that together account for 218 
74% of UK grocery sales [30]. We collected data for this analysis using a web-scraping and data 219 
processing software and database platform called foodDB, which has run continuously since 220 
November 2017. Full details of the methods of data collection using this tool are provided elsewhere 221 
[31]. Briefly, foodDB software collects and processes data automatically on over 99% of all food and 222 
drink products available for purchase on supermarket websites each week, including product name, 223 
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nutritional information, ingredients, product size, price and whether or not the product is on 224 
promotion. A validation exercise comparing foodDB data with equivalent data collected from 295 225 
randomly selected products in real life stores showed high correlation between the two datasets for 226 
price and sugar levels and no evidence of systematic bias in comparison of the two datasets (S3 227 
Appendix). The current dataset consisted of weekly data from foodDB from 26th November 2017 228 
until 17th February 2019, consisting of 64 time points and 302,473 observations. Soft drinks were 229 
dropped from the dataset if they had missing data on price or product size (there were no missing 230 
data on other study variables). Due to changes in UK supermarket website design, on some 231 
occasions the foodDB software fails to make a complete data capture. We removed these occasions 232 
from the analysis by excluding all data collected in weeks where the total number of soft drinks 233 
collected by foodDB was less than 90% of the weekly average in the rest of the dataset. After 234 
exclusions, the foodDB dataset consisted of 277,258 observations over 58 time points. 235 
236 
Fig 1: Data flowchart 237 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 238 
239 
The second dataset provided us with data from prior to the announcement of the SDIL. We used 240 
data from 92,883 observations of soft drinks at 38 monthly time points, from 1st August 2015 to 1st241 
September 2018 acquired from Brandview, a commercial company that collects product data using 242 
methods similar to those used in foodDB on all products available from Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Asda. 243 
After excluding observations with missing price or product size data and excluding time points where 244 
data collection was less than 90% of average, the BrandView dataset provided 88,622 observations 245 
over 37 time points (NB: the removed time point was from the first month, limiting the BrandView 246 
dataset to September 2015 onwards). 247 
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248 
We categorised all observations as ‘intervention’ or ‘control’ based on supermarket categorisation 249 
and manual inspection of product names, using equivalent methods for each dataset.250 
251 
Statistical methods 252 
We used a data-driven approach to build regression models with the aim of reproducing time trends 253 
observed in the datasets and isolating the impact of the announcement and implementation of the 254 
SDIL. We were not aiming to infer the size of the effect of a sugary drink tax on an average soft drink. 255 
This influences our modelling strategy, for example we did not include product-level characteristics 256 
as confounding variables in the CITS models. For all outcome measures we hypothesised that the 257 
SDIL could impact on both the level and the slope of the trend, and thereby included dummy 258 
variables representing the interventions and interaction terms in our regression models (i.e. a ‘level 259 
and slope change analysis’ [32]) and we used likelihood ratio tests to identify whether including both 260 
level and slope changes improved model fit beyond including level change alone (with a threshold 261 
for decision making of p = 0.05). Bernal et al. [29] state that two types of CITS model can be 262 
deployed: separate analysis of the intervention and the control series, or a single model 263 
incorporating both series. The former model estimates the difference between before and after the 264 
event in the intervention series, and uses the control series as a plausibility check – the event should 265 
only impact the intervention series and effects found in the control series could be evidence of 266 
unmeasured confounding variables. The latter model estimates the difference in difference between 267 
the intervention and the control series directly. Here, we use the former approach as due to the 268 
population-level nature of the SDIL it was not possible to acquire location-based controls (i.e. data 269 
on the same drinks but sold in supermarkets unaffected by the SDIL). For all outcome measures, 270 
regression models were run on the control drinks that included identical parameters to the 271 
equivalent models on intervention drinks. All analyses were conducted in R version 3.4.4. 272 
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273 
For each analysis, we first observed trends in the raw data which informed the model building 274 
strategy. Where non-linear trends were observed, we included polynomial regression parameters, 275 
testing each additional parameter for improved model fit using likelihood ratio tests. Because of the 276 
very large number of possible models that could be tested, we restricted exploration of non-linear 277 
effects only to time periods where trends in the non-modelled data clearly deviated from linearity. 278 
Where seasonality was observed, we included dummy variables to capture this. The specific 279 
methods used for each analysis are described below. 280 
281 
Comparison of datasets 282 
S3 Appendix describes the methods and results used to check for consistency between the foodDB 283 
and BrandView datasets. These assessments were based on a comparison dataset with overlapping 284 
data from November 2017 to September 2018. To ensure comparability, all data from Waitrose, 285 
Ocado and Morrisons were removed from the comparison dataset. 286 
287 
Reformulation 288 
To conduct analyses of the impact of the SDIL on sugar content of drinks, overlapping data from 289 
BrandView were removed from the dataset constructed for the comparison of the BrandView and 290 
foodDB data, resulting in a total of 209,637 observations of soft drinks from three supermarkets over 291 
85 time points between September 2015 and February 2019. We built logistic regression models 292 
with dummy variables for the announcement and implementation of the SDIL.   293 
294 
Price 295 
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Observation of trends in the raw data showed little evidence that the announcement of the SDIL had 296 
any impact on price of soft drinks. Therefore, the price analyses were conducted using the foodDB 297 
dataset only. For the price variable, we used the price presented to the consumer for a single item 298 
purchase, which included reductions due to price promotions (e.g. 10% off), but not volume-based 299 
promotions (e.g. buy one get one free). We adjusted prices for an annual inflation rate of 1.7% [33], 300 
presenting all prices as of February 2019. Visual inspections of p-p plots suggested that the price 301 
variable was not normally distributed and contained a long tail of high priced drinks. To convert to 302 
normality, we first excluded outlying drinks with a price greater than £1 per litre and then log-303 
transformed the variable. We conducted linear regression modelling on the log-transformed price 304 
variable. To protect against confounding of the results by drinks moving between SDIL tiers over 305 
time (i.e. by reducing sugar content), we categorised drinks into high levy, low levy and no levy 306 
categories on the basis of the category that they were in after the implementation of the SDIL. To do 307 
this, we matched drinks in the dataset on the basis of name and excluded all drinks that could not be 308 
matched. Inspection of trends revealed that prices of soft drinks were reduced in December as 309 
Christmas promotions kicked in – we therefore included a dummy variable to indicate December in 310 
the price analyses. The price analysis dataset contained 240,048 observations of soft drinks from six 311 
supermarkets over 58 time points. 312 
313 
Product size 314 
For the product size variable we did not exclude drinks sold in multipacks, and for these took the 315 
product size to be the total volume of all individual drinks in the multipack combined. For similar 316 
reasons to the price analysis, we restricted the analysis to the foodDB dataset, excluded outliers and 317 
log-transformed the product size variable, and matched drinks to categorise them on the basis of 318 
levy category after implementation of the SDIL. The product size analysis dataset contained 239,739 319 
observations of soft drinks from six supermarkets over 58 time points. 320 
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321 
Number of soft drinks 322 
For the number of soft drinks analysis we restricted the analysis to the foodDB dataset for similar 323 
reasons to the price and product size analyses. We matched the drinks by name and categorised 324 
each drink on the basis of the levy category for its last appearance in the dataset. We collapsed the 325 
dataset on time point and conducted linear regression analyses on the aggregated ‘number of 326 
drinks’ variable. The collapse of the dataset allowed us to explore whether temporal autocorrelation 327 
was present and how it affected the analyses. To do this, we included a lag term (the number of 328 
drinks at the previous time point) in the model. The number of drinks analysis consisted of 58 time 329 
points for both intervention and control drinks, with aggregated data from six supermarkets at each 330 
time point. 331 
332 
Changes to published protocol 333 
We made the following changes to the pre-specified protocol ([26] and reproduced in S4 Appendix). 334 
We used a different time frame for the analysis which includes an earlier than anticipated initial 335 
date, due to our acquisition of data pre-November 2017 from BrandView. We will undertake further 336 
analyses up to the original proposed end date of April 2020 once data are available. For now we 337 
present analyses up to approximately one year post-implementation of the SDIL, in order to provide 338 
timely evidence of the effects of the levy. The protocol states that we will analyse the impact of the 339 
SDIL on mean sugar content of drinks – upon reflection we considered that a binary classification of 340 
the data (drinks above or below the lower levy sugar threshold) was a more appropriate way to 341 
model manufacturer response to the SDIL. The pre-defined analysis using mean sugar level is 342 
reported in S5 Appendix for completeness. In the protocol, we proposed using alcoholic drinks as the 343 
control series – this was altered as most alcoholic drinks do not report sugar content. 344 
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345 
Results 346 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics comparing the main outcome variables between intervention 347 
and control drinks in each dataset. Further descriptive statistics for the combined BrandView and 348 
foodDB dataset are available in S3 Appendix. Average sugar levels and price were higher in control 349 
drinks, but the average product size was smaller (p < 0.001 in all cases). There were nearly 50% more 350 
intervention than control drinks in the datasets. 351 
352 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sugar levels, price, product size and number of soft drink 353 
observations 354 
N1 Median IQR P2
Sugar (g per 100ml) 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 26,755 10.6 9.8 – 11.6 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 13,857 7.0 6.3 – 7.5 
No levy tier intervention drinks 92,837 0.5 0.0 – 4.3 
All intervention drinks 133,449 4.2 0.2 – 7.1 
All control drinks 76,188 8.2 3.4 – 10.0 <0.001 
Price (p per 100ml)3
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 12,813 25.4 20.2 – 36.5 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 12,535 33.8 26.9 – 40.7 
No levy tier intervention drinks 111,626 14.2 9.0 – 24.0 
All intervention drinks 136,974 17.3 10.1 – 27.4 
All control drinks 103,074 21.3 14.3 – 37.5 <0.001 
Product size (ml) 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 12,111 750 497 – 1006 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 12,613 749 500 – 781 
No levy tier intervention drinks 109,726 1000 548 – 1974 
All intervention drinks 134,450 1000 500 – 1842 
All control drinks 105,289 950 593 – 1000 <0.001 
Number per week 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 58 256 252 – 291 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 58 298 287 – 311 
No levy tier intervention drinks 58 2274 2245 – 2319 
All intervention drinks 58 2862 2795-2902 
All control drinks 58 1971 1946-2010 <0.001 
1 For ‘sugar’, ‘price’ and ‘product size’, this represents the total number of observations over all time points 355 
included in the analyses. For ‘number per week’, all observations are collapsed in each time point, so this 356 
represents the number of time points in the analyses. 2 From Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing intervention 357 
and control drinks. 3 Adjusted to February 2019 prices. IQR = Interquartile range. Note that for price and 358 
product size, the categorisation by levy tier is based on the categorisation of products after implementation of 359 
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the levy, for number per week it is based on the last observation in the dataset, and for sugar it is based on the 360 
sugar level at the point of observation.361 
362 
Table 2 compares the proportion of drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold with the 363 
counterfactual scenario in which pre-announcement trends were extrapolated, with the trend for all 364 
intervention and control drinks shown in Fig 2. The proportion of intervention drinks over the lower 365 
levy sugar threshold reduced after the announcement of the SDIL only slowly at first, but with rapid 366 
changes just prior to the implementation. Just 50 days before the implementation, intervention 367 
drinks with enough sugar to be included in the levy had fallen by 19.5 (95% CI: 18.9, 20.1) 368 
percentage points – 50 days after implementation intervention drinks had fallen by 30.7 (30.3, 31.2) 369 
percentage points. As of February 2019, only 15.4% (14.8%, 15.9%) of intervention soft drinks were 370 
above the lower levy sugar threshold. Equivalent models for the control drinks found little evidence 371 
of impact of the announcement or implementation of the SDIL on percentage of drinks above each 372 
levy threshold (see S2 Appendix for all model results). The pattern of sugar reduction in own-brand 373 
and branded drinks was very different – for own-brand drinks, sugar levels were already falling 374 
before the announcement of the SDIL, but these falls accelerated after the announcement. By the 375 
time of the implementation of the SDIL, only 6.9% (6.3%, 7.6%) of own-brand intervention drinks 376 
remained over the lower levy sugar threshold and further sugar reduction stalled. For branded 377 
drinks, there was a large fall in the proportion of drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold at the 378 
point of the implementation, which resulted in a 43.5 (42.9, 44.1) percentage point fall in the 379 
number of branded intervention drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold by February 2019, 380 
leaving only 17.6% (17.0%, 18.2%) of branded drinks above the lower levy sugar threshold..  381 
382 
Table 2: Difference between observed and counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-announcement 383 
trends) percentage of soft drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold 384 
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Difference in percentage1 of drinks over lower levy sugar threshold (95% confidence 
intervals) 
Percentage over 
lower levy 
threshold 
before 
announcement 
5th May 2016(50 
days post-
announcement) 
15th February 2018 
(50 days pre-
implementation) 
26th May 2018(50 
days post-
implementation) 
17th February 2019 
(End of dataset) 
All intervention drinks 51.7 (50.9, 52.6) -0.1 (-1.3, 1.1) -19.5 (-20.1, -18.9) -30.7 (-31.2, -30.3) -33.8 (-34.4, -33.3) 
Branded 
intervention drinks 
57.9 (57.0, 59.0) -1.1 (-2.4, 0.3) -23.8 (-24.5, -23.1) -38.3 (-38.9, -37.8) -43.5 (-44.1, -42.9) 
Own-brand 
intervention drinks 
34.8 (33.2, 36.4) 2.5 (0.3, 4.7) -11.5 (-12.2, -10.7) -12.2 (-12.9, -11.5) -9.4 (-10.2, -8.6) 
All control drinks 68.1 (66.8, 69.3) 0.6 (-1.0, 2.2) -5.8 (-6.6, -5.1) -6.9 (-7.6, -6.2) -7.9 (-8.9, -7.0) 
1 Results are presented as percentage point differences compared to the counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-385 
announcement trend). 386 
387 
Fig 2: Proportion of soft drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold388 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 389 
390 
Table 3 shows the results of the price analysis, with Fig 3 showing the trend for intervention and 391 
control drinks, separately for branded and own-brand drinks. Branded drinks passed on about half of 392 
the levy on higher levy tier drinks (i.e. the price increase on these drinks was half of the levy rate), 393 
whilst the prices of lower levy tier drinks reduced after implementation of the SDIL. In contrast, own-394 
brand drinks saw large changes in price with higher levy tier drinks reducing in price by 62.5p per L 395 
(52.4, 72.1) and lower levy tier drinks increasing by 68.6p per L (56.9, 81.1) – Fig 2 shows how the 396 
price point for these two categories converged after the implementation of the SDIL.397 
398 
Table 3: Difference between the observed and counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-399 
implementation trends) in prices of soft drinks as of 26th May 2018 (50 days post-implementation) 400 
Mean price before 
implementation, pence (p) 
per litre (95% CI)1
Difference in price, 
pence (p) per litre (95% CI)1
Pass-on rate2
All drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 251.0 (240.3, 262.2) 7.5 (3.7, 11.5) 31% (15%, 48%) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 319.3 (305.8, 333.4) -10.7 (-15.3, -6.0) -59% (-85%, -33%) 
18 
No levy tier intervention drinks 135.4 (127.7, 143.6) 3.6 (2.6, 4.7) n/a 
Control drinks 227.5 (215.7, 239.9) -1.5 (-3.0, 0.1) n/a 
Branded drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 250.5 (239.7, 261.8) 11.8 (7.7, 15.9) 49% (32%, 66%) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 336.5 (323.6, 350.0) -17.4 (-22.0, -12.8) -97% (-122%, -71%) 
No levy tier intervention drinks 162.9 (154.9, 171.4) 2.6 (1.4, 3.8) n/a 
Control drinks 269.3 (256.6, 282.6) -4.1 (-5.9, -2.2) n/a 
Own-brand drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 268.8 (260.8, 277.1) -62.5 (-72.1, -52.4) -260% (-300%, -218%) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 123.2 (118.8, 127.8) 68.6 (56.9, 81.1) 381% (316%, 451%) 
No levy tier intervention drinks 70.7 (67.1, 74.5) -0.8 (-1.9, -0.3) n/a 
Control drinks 122.8 (118.6, 127.1) 0.1 (-1.1, 1.4) n/a 
1 Adjusted to February 2019 prices. 2 Higher levy tier drinks are levied at £0.24 (24p) per litre, lower levy tier 401 
drinks are levied at £0.18 (18p) per litre, no levy tier drinks and control drinks are not levied. The pass-on rate is 402 
the percentage of the levy that was passed to the consumer as a change in price.403 
404 
405 
Fig 3: Change in price of a) branded and b) own-brand soft drinks by sugar content 406 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 407 
408 
Table 4 shows the results for product size and number of drinks available in supermarkets. For 409 
product size, there was very little impact of the SDIL on branded drinks, which showed only small 410 
fluctuations in product size after implementation of the SDIL of similar magnitude to variations 411 
observed in the control drinks. However, for own-brand drinks we observed a similar convergence as 412 
seen in the price analyses – here, drinks levied at the lower level reduced in average product size 413 
and drinks levied at the higher rate increased until the average product size in both were similar. For 414 
product diversity, the inclusion of lag terms had little impact on model results. The models used for 415 
table 4 and reported in S2 Appendix did not account for autocorrelation. We saw little evidence that 416 
the SDIL impacted on the number of drinks available in supermarkets – in general products that left 417 
were replaced with new products. The largest difference between the observed and counterfactual 418 
scenarios was for control drinks, and these results were based on regression models which 419 
suggested only very weak evidence of impact of the SDIL (see S2 Appendix).420 
421 
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Table 4: Difference between product size and diversity in product range of soft drinks in the 422 
modelled and counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-implementation trends) results as of 26th May 423 
2018 (50 days post-implementation) 424 
Difference in product size, ml (95% 
CI) 
Difference in number of products 
available (95% CI) 
All drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 1 (-15, 17) -3 (-12, 6) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 13 (3, 23) -1 (-11, 8) 
No levy tier intervention drinks -2 (-10, 6) -54 (-120, 11) 
Control drinks 4 (0, 8) -111 (-161, -61) 
Branded drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks -7 (-23, 11) -10 (-18, -1) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks 16 (6, 27) 2 (-7, 10) 
No levy tier intervention drinks 0 (-9, 9) -13 (-63, 38) 
Control drinks 6 (1, 11) -91 (-131, -51) 
Own-brand drinks 
Higher levy tier intervention drinks 172 (133, 214) 6 (5, 7) 
Lower levy tier intervention drinks -141 (-170, -111) 2 (1, 4) 
No levy tier intervention drinks 6 (-7, 20) -42 (-59, -24) 
Control drinks 7 (-0, 15) -20 (-32, -8) 
425 
426 
Discussion 427 
The SDIL was associated with a large reduction in the percentage of soft drinks (particularly branded 428 
drinks) that are subject to the levy, due to large reductions in the sugar levels of these drinks. There 429 
was no evidence for similar reductions in control SDIL-exempt drinks, suggesting that the SDIL was 430 
the motivating factor for this change. We found that the levy was not directly passed on to the 431 
consumer through commensurate increases in the prices of targeted drinks, but manufacturers and 432 
retailers appear to have taken the opportunity to undertake wider revision of their entire soft drink 433 
market offer. For example: there were changes in both prices and volumes of drinks; only half of the 434 
levy on branded higher levy tier drinks was passed on to consumers, whilst low sugar variants also 435 
increased in price; and price points for own-brand higher and lower levy tier drinks converged. 436 
Without sales data to weight the results reported here it is not possible to estimate whether the full 437 
extent of the levy was passed on to consumers via increases in prices. Our analysis of product size 438 
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suggested that manufacturers of branded drinks did not react to the SDIL by changing product sizes. 439 
However, supermarkets made large changes to their own-brand product sizes of higher and lower 440 
levy tier drinks. About 30% of the price per volume increase on own-brand lower levy tier drinks can 441 
be accounted for by the reduction in product sizes – an instance of so-called ‘shrinkflation’ [34]. We 442 
did not observe any changes in the number of soft drinks available to consumers as a result of the 443 
SDIL. 444 
445 
These results suggest that the SDIL has stimulated  decreases of sugar levels of soft drinks. 446 
Reductions were due to reformulation of existing products and replacement of drinks with lower 447 
sugar varieties. The stimulus for these changes are likely to include both supply and demand factors 448 
– manufacturers may be influenced to reduce sugar levels to avoid the levy, or may be prompted by 449 
a change in demand for lower sugar soft drinks after the widespread media attention related to the 450 
announcement of the levy. Our results also confirm that the SDIL currently only applies to a small 451 
percentage of the soft drinks that are available in the UK grocery market – control drinks make up 452 
over a third of the available soft drinks, and by February 2019 only 15% of the intervention drinks 453 
were being levied (the remaining 85% had sugar levels lower than the levy sugar threshold). The 454 
lower levy sugar threshold (5g per 100ml) is set at a higher level than for the majority of jurisdictions 455 
that have instituted sugar drink taxes worldwide [35] and our data show that in February 2019, 65% 456 
of control drinks contained greater than or equal to 5g sugar per 100ml. After the implementation of 457 
the SDIL, we observed a peak in the proportion of intervention drinks with a sugar level between 4.5 458 
and 5.0g per 100ml (see S5 Appendix), suggesting that many manufacturers chose to reformulate to 459 
just below this threshold. The second chapter of the UK Government’s childhood obesity plan [36] 460 
suggests that the SDIL may be extended to milk-based drinks. Our analyses suggest that if 461 
manufacturers of milk-based drinks behave similarly, then this extension could prompt reductions in 462 
sugar levels. Given the preponderance of drinks with sugar levels just below 5g per 100ml, a gradual 463 
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lowering of the lower levy sugar threshold, similar to gradual lowering of salt targets in the UK [37], 464 
could also have public health benefits. We also observed that the SDIL was associated with increases 465 
in price of non-targeted drinks (intervention drinks with sugar levels lower than the lower levy sugar 466 
threshold, such as diet variants). This has not previously been observed for other sugary drink taxes 467 
implemented elsewhere [22, 24, 25, 38], suggesting that the nature of the levy (a levy on 468 
manufacturers and importers based on reported sales, rather than an excise tax on consumers) may 469 
have influenced industry behaviour more widely.  470 
471 
The tiered design of the SDIL is also being implemented in other jurisdictions including South Africa, 472 
Ireland and Portugal [35] and it is therefore important to establish whether such a design influences 473 
the behaviour of manufacturers. We analysed a comprehensive set of data on soft drinks available 474 
for purchase in the leading supermarkets in the UK, which provided adequate statistical power for 475 
the analyses and generalisability of the results to the UK grocery market. However, due to the non-476 
randomised design of the study it is not possible to rule out the possibility of residual confounding in 477 
our analyses. We have demonstrated specificity for some of our results – similar changes in sugar 478 
content, price and product size were not shown in the control drinks – which suggests that the 479 
results were not confounded by unmeasured variables.  480 
481 
Our results are not sales weighted, so do not give an account of how sugar consumption from drinks 482 
may have changed over the time period. We have not been able to include soft drinks that are only 483 
available in supermarket chains or other types of retail outlet outside of those included in this 484 
analysis, although as the supermarkets included here are the market leaders this is unlikely to be a 485 
major limitation. We were not able to identify soft drinks produced or distributed by manufacturers 486 
and importers with UK sales less than 1 million litres per year, which were therefore incorrectly 487 
included in ‘intervention’ drinks. Data collected from web scraping tools (which is the case for both 488 
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datasets used in these analyses) only reflect data that are presented in online supermarkets, which 489 
may not reflect the in-store environment, although our initial validation exercise on 295 food and 490 
drink products show no evidence of systematic bias when collecting data from online supermarkets 491 
(S3 Appendix). The data-driven approaches that we have used for the modelling strategy may lead to 492 
over-fitted models which can limit the generalisability of these results to other jurisdictions 493 
considering introducing a similarly structured levy [39]. Further, our aim was to reproduce trends 494 
observed in the UK over the time period studied using a near-comprehensive dataset of drinks 495 
available for purchase, but we did not aim to isolate the independent effect of the SDIL on an 496 
‘average’ drink adjusted for product and supermarket characteristics. As a result, it is unlikely that 497 
the magnitude of our results will be generalizable to other jurisdictions considering introducing a 498 
similar levy. The control series may not be isolated from effects of the SDIL (e.g. manufacturers may 499 
choose to adapt prices of control drinks in response to the SDIL since they are a potential substitute 500 
for intervention drinks). Due to the lack of a unique product identifier in the dataset, it was not 501 
possible to analyse these data as a panel series, and hence we were unable to account for the 502 
autocorrelation structure in any of the analyses with the exception of the ‘number of products’ 503 
analysis. 504 
505 
Other studies have used CITS to evaluate the impact of voluntary soft drink price increases that have 506 
been implemented in the UK [40,41] and soft drink taxes implemented elsewhere in the world 507 
[23,24,25, 38] and have shown that they have resulted in reduced sales of targeted drinks [42] and 508 
that price increases are generally passed on to the consumer on targeted drinks, but not always the 509 
full tax - the French soda tax had a differential pass-on rate in different communities, with more 510 
deprived areas having large pass-on rates and an average pass-on rate of 40% [38]. To our 511 
knowledge, no previous study has evaluated the impact of an economic instrument for stimulating 512 
reformulation of soft drinks. A public health campaign to encourage voluntary soft drink 513 
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reformulation in Austria was shown to result in a 13% increase in the number of drinks under the 514 
campaign threshold of 7.4g sugar per 100ml over a seven year period [43], and the  voluntary UK salt 515 
reduction campaign that began in the mid-2000s has been shown to have reduced salt levels in 516 
commonly consumed food groups by 7% between 2006 and 2011 [44] and up to 47% since 2004 for 517 
breakfast cereals (albeit based on a small sample) [45]. An evaluation of the UK Public Health 518 
Responsibility Deal, which asked food manufacturers to make pledges for reformulation, found that 519 
inherent conflicts within the food system limit the ability of voluntary processes to make sizeable 520 
impacts [46]. Our results show a much steeper decline in targeted nutrient levels than those that 521 
have been observed in the UK and elsewhere, suggesting that economic instruments may be more 522 
effective at changing manufacturer behaviour than voluntary public health interventions. Public 523 
Health England (PHE) used data provided by a commercial party on sales of soft drinks between 524 
2015 and 2018 and found that there was reduction of 29% in sales-weighted average sugar content 525 
of drinks over this time period [47]. A separate analysis found a 30% reduction in sales-weighted 526 
sugar levels between 2015 and 2018 [48] using datasets independent from PHE. The PHE analysis 527 
differs from ours in three important aspects – they do not account for background trends in sugar 528 
levels, their data includes purchases from a wider range of retail outlets, and their results are sales-529 
weighted. Our equivalent analysis is shown in S5 Appendix – we found a 2.13g per 100ml (2.08, 2.18) 530 
fall in sugar levels in intervention drinks due to the announcement and implementation of the SDIL – 531 
this relates to a 38% reduction from average sugar levels in September-December 2015. 532 
533 
The SDIL incentivised many manufacturers to reduce sugar in soft drinks. Some of the SDIL was 534 
passed onto consumers as higher prices, but not always on targeted drinks. These changes could 535 
reduce population exposure to sugars and associated health risks. Further work should investigate 536 
the impact of the SDIL on consumer behaviour by influencing purchasing and consumption of soft 537 
drinks, as has been shown elsewhere in the world [23-25, 49]. The impact of these changes on 538 
24 
consumer behaviour, including substitution effects, will be explored as part of our ongoing 539 
evaluation of the SDIL, which will also explore the impact of the SDIL on the economy, consumer 540 
attitudes, measured short term and modelled long term health outcomes [26]. 541 
542 
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S1 Appendix: Comparison of foodDB and BrandView datasets 
Introduction: This appendix provides a comparison of the two datasets that have been combined for 
analysis of the impact of the announcement and implementation of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy 
(SDIL) on the proportion of drinks over each levy threshold (see main paper and appendix 3) and on 
the mean sugar levels in drinks (see appendix 2). 
Methods: We used data collected from the websites of the three leading UK supermarkets (Asda, 
Sainsbury’s and Tesco) that together account for 58% of UK grocery sales1. One source was a web-
scraping and data processing software platform called foodDB which was developed in-house by 
researchers in the Centre on Population Approaches for Non-Communicable Disease Prevention at 
the University of Oxford. Full details of the methods of data collection using foodDB are provided 
elsewhere2. Briefly, foodDB collects data on over 99% of all food and drink products available for 
purchase on the supermarket websites each week, including product name, nutritional information, 
ingredients, product size, price and whether or not the product is on promotion.  
To assess validity of the data collected by foodDB, a validation exercise was conducted that 
compared foodDB data with equivalent data collected from 295 randomly selected products in real 
life stores. Agreement between foodDB and the store sample for both sugar levels (g per 100g / 
100ml) and price (£ per 100g / 100ml) was measured by assessing percentage agreement between 
the two sources and observing Bland-Altman plots for detection of bias. For percentage agreement, 
we rounded sugar levels to the nearest gram per 100g / 100ml, as this data was not always recorded 
to the same number of decimal places in each dataset. 
For the controlled interrupted time series analyses, we used weekly data from foodDB from 26th 
November 2017 (its initial data collection period) until 17th February 2019, consisting of 58 time 
points (NB: 6 weeks of data collection were excluded from the dataset, due to errors with the data 
collection which resulted in collection of data on less than 90% of all observed drinks).  
The second data source was the commercial company BrandView, which extracts data from 
products available in Asda, Sainsbury’s and Tesco. We purchased data corresponding to the first of 
every month between August 2015 and September 2018. The initial data point was dropped as data 
was available for less than 90% of all observed drinks, leaving 37 time points.  
Both the foodDB and BrandView datasets were restricted to our definition of soft drinks (see main 
paper), and then categorised as intervention or control based on supermarket categorisation and 
manual inspection of product names, using similar code and methods for each dataset. We 
categorised drinks as ‘own-brand’ if the product name contained Asda, Tesco or Sainsbury’s, and as 
‘branded’ otherwise. 
To compare data collected from these two sources we compared drink categories, supermarkets, 
branded status, intervention / control status, price, product size and sugar level with Chi squared 
tests for categorical variables and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for continuous variables. We observed 
trends in own-brand and branded products separately across the entire data collection period 
1 Kantar World Panel. Grocery market share UK. 12 weeks ending September 2018. Available at 
https://www.kantarworldpanel.com/en/grocery-market-share/great-britain Accessed 24th April 2019. 
2 Harrington RA, Adhikari V, Rayner M, Scarborough P. Nutrient composition databases in the age of big data: 
foodDB, a comprehensive, real-time database infrastructure. BMJ Open, 2019 (in press). 
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(including November 2017 – September 2018 where data were available from both sources). We 
plotted trends in the following variables: Number of products per data snapshot; mean sugar levels 
(g per 100ml); geometric mean price (p per 100ml); and geometric mean product size (ml). NB: 
geometric means were used for comparability with the main analyses, where these variables were 
log-transformed for the regression models. 
Results: Of the 295 products identified in real-life stores and compared with equivalent products 
collected using foodDB, 193 had data for sugar levels in both datasets and 254 had data for price in 
both datasets. For sugar, 90.0% (95% confidence intervals 85.3%-93.9%) had the same sugar levels. 
For price, 77.6% (72.4%-82.7%) of the products matched between the online and real-life stores. 
The Bland-Altman plots are shown in Figs A and B and demonstrate no evidence of systematic 
difference between the two data sources. 
Fig A Bland-Altman plot comparing price (p per 100g / 100ml) of 254 products identified in real-life 
stores and online 
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Fig B Bland-Altman plot comparing sugar (g per 100g / 100ml) of 193 products identified in real-life 
stores and online 
Table A shows descriptive statistics for the two datasets. There were differences between the two 
datasets in both the types of drinks observed and the amount of observations from each 
supermarket, with the foodDB dataset collecting data on similar number of drinks from each of the 
three supermarkets whereas BrandView predominantly provided data from Tesco. Splits between 
branded and own-brand status, and between intervention and control drinks were similar across the 
two datasets, but a greater proportion of branded products and control drinks were found in 
foodDB. There were small differences in the median price and sugar levels of drinks collected in the 
two datasets, which may reflect the different time periods over which data were collected. 
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Table A Descriptive statistics comparing the foodDB and BrandView datasets 
Variable foodDB BrandView p1
Type of drink, n (%)
Carbonate 44,230 (30.7) 33,323 (37.6)
Energy drink 13,832 (9.6) 3,434 (3.9)
Squash or cordial 12,061 (8.4) 7,887 (8.9)
Flavoured water 8,539 (5.9) 4,125 (4.7)
Milk-based drink 20,157 (14.0) 9,480 (10.7)
Fruit juice and smoothies 45,253 (31.4) 30,373 (34.3) <0.001
Supermarket, n (%)
Tesco 47,632 (33.0) 51,254 (57.8)
Sainsbury’s 50,069 (34.8) 15,963 (18.0)
Asda 46,371 (32.2) 21,405 (24.2) <0.001
Branded status, n (%)
Branded 110,924 (77.0) 63,460 (71.6)
Own-brand 33,148 (23.0) 25,162 (28.4) <0.001
SDIL status, n (%)
Intervention 89,175 (61.9) 59,703 (67.4)
Control 54,897 (38.1) 28,919 (32.6) <0.001
Price £ per 100ml, median (IQR) 0.17 (0.10-0.27) 0.15 (0.10-0.25) <0.001
Product size ml, median (IQR) 1000 (604-1500) 1000 (500-1500) 0.504
Sugar g per 100ml, median (IQR) 4.6 (0.5-8.6) 5.1 (0.5-10.0) <0.001
1 p values are derived from Chi-squared tests for categorical variables and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
for continuous variables 
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Fig C shows overlapping trends in key variables between the two datasets. For mean sugar levels, 
price and product size there is strong agreement between the two datasets for own-brand products. 
However, for branded products there is less agreement. Mean product size and price were higher in 
branded foods (by 65ml and 0.99p per 100ml, respectively) in the foodDB dataset than in the 
BrandView dataset, and mean sugar levels were lower by 0.16g per 100ml. 
Both the foodDB and BrandView datasets collected similar number of own-brand products at each 
data collection snapshot, but foodDB collected on average 225 more branded drinks per snapshot.
Fig C Comparison of trend data in BrandView (Sep 15 – Sep 18) and foodDB (Nov 17 – Feb 19) for 
branded and own-brand products separately for A: number of drinks per snapshot, B: mean sugar 
level (g per 100ml), C: mean price (p per 100ml), D: mean product size (ml) 
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S2 Appendix: Analysis of impact of soft drinks industry levy on mean sugar levels 
Introduction: This appendix reports results of a pre-determined analysis (see pre-published protocol 
https://njl-admin.nihr.ac.uk/document/download/2010886) of the impact of the announcement and 
implementation of the SDIL on mean sugar levels of intervention and control soft drinks in the UK. 
Methods: We used the same dataset that was used for our analysis of the impact of the SDIL on the 
proportion of soft drinks above the levy sugar threshold, with the same definitions of intervention 
and control drinks. The main analysis is restricted to intervention drinks, with a second analysis using 
the same regression model but restricted to control drinks. Mean sugar levels over time were 
compared with a counterfactual which extrapolates trends from the period before the 
announcement of the SDIL. Full details of the datasets used, including definitions of key terms, can 
be found in the main manuscript. 
The outcome variable for this analysis (sugar level of soft drinks) was not normally distributed in the 
dataset, nor did it follow a distribution that could be transformed to normality. Therefore, linear 
regression using the continuous variable was not appropriate. Instead, we collapsed the dataset into 
mean sugar levels (g per 100ml) for intervention and control drinks in the 85 time points between 
September 2015 and February 2019 available in the dataset. Linear regression models were then run 
against these collapsed data points. 
Initial observation of the man sugar levels over time suggested non-linear trends between the 
announcement and implementation of the SDIL. Therefore, models were built allowing for 
polynomial trends during this period, with the final model selected on the basis of likelihood ratio 
tests comparing nested models using a threshold of p = 0.05 to decide whether adding extra 
polynomial order improved model fit sufficiently. This resulted in a cubic polynomial model fit 
between these points. 
Although the continuous outcome variable used in the linear regression models (mean sugar levels) 
was not normally distributed, inspection of model residuals did not reveal any evidence of 
heteroscedasticity or deviation from normality. 
We observed the distribution of sugar levels in drinks prior to the announcement of the SDIL and 
after its implementation to explore how manufacturers had reformulated their products. 
Results: Fig D shows the trend in mean sugar levels of both intervention and control drinks over 
time. For intervention drinks, sugar levels were falling slowly before the announcement of the SDIL 
(p = 0.020), but accelerated after the announcement (p < 0.001), culminating in a substantial 
reduction in sugar levels just before the implementation of the SDIL (p < 0.001). After the 
implementation, the trend in sugar levels returned to a level that was not different to pre-
announcement trends (p = 0.666). By February 2019, mean sugar levels in intervention soft drinks 
were lower than the counterfactual scenario of no SDIL by 2.13g per 100ml (95% CI: 2.08, 2.18). The 
control analysis found no evidence of difference in trends due to either the announcement or the 
implementation of the SDIL. 
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Fig D Mean sugar levels (g per 100ml) for eligible and exempt drinks, September 2015 – February 
2019 
Fig E shows histograms of the sugar levels in observations of drinks before the announcement of the 
SDIL and after its introduction. Prior to the announcement of the SDIL, there is a large spike of drinks 
with less than 1g sugar per 100ml, but sugar levels in drinks are fairly even elsewhere. After the 
implementation of the SDIL, there is another large spike in drinks with sugar levels between 4.5g and 
5.0g sugar per 100ml, suggesting that manufacturers reacted to the levy by removing just enough 
sugar from drinks to avoid the levy. 
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Fig E Sugar levels (g per 100ml) in observations of drinks prior to the announcement of the SDIL 
and post-implementation of the SDIL 
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S3 Appendix: Analysis of impact of soft drinks industry levy on proportion of drinks over higher 
levy threshold (8g sugar per 100ml) 
Introduction: The main paper reports results of models that measure the impact of the 
announcement and the implementation of the SDIL on the proportion of intervention and control 
drinks that are over the levy sugar threshold (5g sugar per 100ml). This appendix reports equivalent 
results for models that measure the impact of the SDIL on the proportion of drinks over the high levy 
threshold (8g sugar per 100ml). 
Methods: The datasets used, definitions of key terms and descriptions of regression models used are 
reported in the main paper. The only difference is the threshold used for the binary variable in the 
logistic regression models – here the outcome variable is 1 if a drink contains greater than 8g sugar 
per 100ml and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we show trends in the raw data for both intervention and 
control drinks over both levy thresholds using stacked line charts. 
Results: Table B compares the percentage of drinks over the high levy threshold with a 
counterfactual where the SDIL was not announced or implemented and Fig F shows the results for all 
intervention and control drinks. The percentage of intervention drinks over the high levy threshold 
reduced after the announcement of the SDIL only slowly at first, but with rapid changes just prior to 
the implementation. Just 50 days before the implementation, intervention drinks with enough sugar 
to be levied at the high rate had fallen by 20.0 (95% CI: 19.5, 20.5) percentage points – 50 days after 
implementation drinks levied at this rate had fallen by 28.7 (28.3, 29.0) percentage points. As of 
February 2019, there was a 31.3 (30.9, 31.6) percentage point fall, leaving only 7.1% (6.7%, 7.5%) of 
intervention drinks above the high levy threshold. Equivalent models for the control drinks found no 
impact of the announcement or implementation of the SDIL on percentage of drinks above the high 
levy threshold (p > 0.05 for all regression parameters). Due to a (non-significant) upwards trend in 
the percentage of control drinks above the high levy threshold before the announcement, the 
comparison with the counterfactual shows considerable falls (see Fig F). The pattern of sugar 
reduction in own-brand and branded drinks was very different – for own-brand drinks, sugar levels 
were already falling before the announcement of the SDIL, but these falls accelerated after the 
announcement. However, by the time of the implementation of the SDIL, only 3.5% (3.1%, 4.0%) of 
own-brand eligible drinks remained over the high levy threshold and further sugar reduction stalled. 
For branded drinks, there was a large fall in the proportion of drinks either side of the 
implementation of the levy, which had resulted in a 40.4 (40.0, 40.9) percentage point fall in the 
number of branded eligible drinks over the high levy threshold by February 2019.  
Table B: Difference between observed and counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-announcement 
trends) percentage of drinks over the high levy sugar threshold (>8g sugar per 100ml) 
Difference in percentage1 of drinks over levy sugar threshold (95% confidence intervals) 
5th May 2016
(50 days post-
announcement) 
15th February 2018 
(50 days pre-
implementation) 
26th May 2018
(50 days post-
implementation) 
17th February 2019 
(End of dataset) 
All intervention drinks -0.0 (-1.6, 0.7) -20.0 (-20.5, -19.5) -28.7 (-29.0, -28.3) -31.3 (-31.6, -30.9) 
Branded intervention drinks -1.3 (-2.7, -0.0) -24.7 (-25.3, -24.1) -36.1 (-36.5, -35.7) -40.4 (-40.9, -40.0) 
Own-brand intervention drinks 1.8 (-0.1, 3.8) -9.6 (-10.1, -8.9) -9.8 (-10.3, -9.3) -7.7 (-8.2, -7.0) 
All control drinks 1.3 (-0.4, -3.0) -11.9 (-12.7, -11.1) -13.5 (-14.2, -12.7) -15.6 (-16.5, -14.6) 
1 Results are presented as percentage point differences compared to the counterfactual (extrapolation of pre-
announcement trend). 
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Fig F: Change in proportion of drinks over the high levy threshold (8g sugar per 100ml), September 
2015 to February 2019, intervention and control drinks, compared to counterfactual scenario of no 
SDIL 
Fig G shows the proportion of both intervention and control drinks over each levy threshold and 
shows how the pace of reformulation of intervention drinks increased between the announcement 
and implementation of the SDIL. 
Fig G Trends in the proportion of intervention (eligible) and control (exempt) drinks over each levy 
threshold 
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S4 Appendix: Model parameters for all models presented in the main analysis and 
supplementary material 
Parameter description: 
T Time, measured in 100 day units, with T = 0 at the point of the implementation of 
the SDIL (6th April 2018) 
A Dummy variable indicating the time between the announcement (16th March 2016) 
and implementation (6th April 2018) of the UK soft drinks industry levy (SDIL) – This 
parameter estimates the level change due to announcement of the SDIL 
AT Interaction between A and T 
ATT Interaction between A and T2
ATTT Interaction between A and T3 – These parameters estimate the slope change due 
to the announcement of the SDIL 
I Dummy variable indicating the time after the implementation of the SDIL – This 
parameter estimates the level change due to the implementation of the SDIL 
IT Interaction between I and T – This parameter estimates the slope change due to 
the implementation of the SDIL
Dec A dummy variable indicating the month of December 
Table C: Model parameters for all models reported in main paper 
Parameter Effect size 95% confidence 
intervals
p
Above levy sugar threshold, intervention drinks
(Intercept) -0.005 (-0.504, 0.495) 0.985
T -0.009 (-0.067, 0.049) 0.77
A -1.036 (-1.538, -0.533) <0.001
AT -0.462 (-0.554, -0.370) <0.001
ATT -0.083 (-0.106, -0.059) <0.001
ATTT -0.005 (-0.008, -0.003) <0.001
I -1.394 (-1.895, -0.893) <0.001
IT -0.089 (-0.150, -0.027) 0.005
Above levy sugar thresholds, control drinks
(Intercept) 0.932 (0.117, 1.747) 0.025
T 0.020 (-0.074, 0.115) 0.673
A -0.304 (-1.121, 0.513) 0.465
AT -0.070 (-0.206, 0.065) 0.309
ATT -0.009 (-0.041, 0.024) 0.612
ATTT -0.001 (-0.004, 0.002) 0.629
I -0.312 (-1.127, 0.504) 0.454
IT -0.020 (-0.117, 0.078) 0.694
Price, all drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 3.243 (3.224, 3.262) <0.001
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Parameter Effect size 95% confidence 
intervals
p
T 0.021 (0.010, 0.031) <0.001
I 0.029 (-0.002, 0.059) 0.064
Dec -0.024 (-0.049, 0.002) 0.068
Price, all drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 3.493 (3.474, 3.512) <0.001
T 0.019 (0.009, 0.028) <0.001
I -0.033 (-0.063, -0.003) 0.031
Dec -0.064 (-0.089, -0.039) <0.001
Price, all drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 2.630 (2.621, 2.639) <0.001
T 0.022 (0.017, 0.027) <0.001
I 0.025 (0.011, 0.040) <0.001
Dec -0.036 (-0.049, -0.024) <0.001
Price, all drinks, control
(Intercept) 3.128 (3.120, 3.137) <0.001
T 0.006 (0.002, 0.011) 0.006
I -0.006 (-0.020, 0.007) 0.357
Dec 0.002 (-0.009, 0.014) 0.693
Price, branded drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 3.241 (3.221, 3.260) <0.001
T 0.021 (0.010, 0.031) <0.001
I 0.045 (0.013, 0.076) 0.005
Dec -0.023 (-0.049, 0.004) 0.09
Price, branded drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 3.549 (3.531, 3.566) <0.001
T 0.022 (0.012, 0.031) <0.001
I -0.051 (-0.079, -0.023) <0.001
Dec -0.068 (-0.091, -0.045) <0.001
Price, branded drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 2.810 (2.801, 2.819) <0.001
T 0.014 (0.009, 0.019) <0.001
I 0.015 (0.001, 0.030) 0.040
Dec -0.038 (-0.05, -0.026) <0.001
Price, branded drinks, control
(Intercept) 3.297 (3.288, 3.306) <0.001
T 0.007 (0.002, 0.012) 0.004
I -0.015 (-0.029, -0.001) 0.036
Dec 0.004 (-0.008, 0.015) 0.539
Price, own-brand drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 3.311 (3.228, 3.393) <0.001
T 0.016 (-0.017, 0.049) 0.336
I -0.256 (-0.368, -0.144) <0.001
Dec -0.032 (-0.124, 0.059) 0.490
Price, own-brand drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 2.496 (2.403, 2.590) <0.001
T -0.017 (-0.061, 0.026) 0.433
I 0.451 (0.312, 0.590) <0.001
Dec 0.013 (-0.102, 0.129) 0.822
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Parameter Effect size 95% confidence 
intervals
p
Price, own-brand drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 1.976 (1.958, 1.994) <0.001
T 0.028 (0.018, 0.038) <0.001
I -0.011 (-0.040, 0.019) 0.467
Dec -0.001 (-0.025, 0.022) 0.909
Price, own-brand drinks, control
(Intercept) 2.508 (2.495, 2.520) <0.001
T 0.002 (-0.005, 0.009) 0.556
I 0.001 (-0.019, 0.021) 0.920
Dec 0.005 (-0.012, 0.022) 0.570
Product size, all drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.629 (6.603, 6.656) <0.001
T -0.048 (-0.063, -0.033) <0.001
I 0.001 (-0.043, 0.046) 0.960
Product size, all drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.455 (6.436, 6.474) <0.001
T 0.010 (0.000, 0.021) 0.059
I 0.020 (-0.011, 0.051) 0.210
Product size, all drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.922 (6.914, 6.931) <0.001
T -0.011 (-0.016, -0.006) <0.001
I -0.002 (-0.017, 0.013) 0.783
Product size, all drinks, control
(Intercept) 6.580 (6.572, 6.587) <0.001
T -0.003 (-0.007, 0.001) 0.132
I 0.006 (-0.006, 0.018) 0.321
Product size, branded drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.635 (6.608, 6.663) <0.001
T -0.048 (-0.063, -0.032) <0.001
I -0.009 (-0.055, 0.038) 0.711
Product size, branded drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.432 (6.413, 6.451) <0.001
T 0.008 (-0.003, 0.019) 0.151
I 0.026 (-0.006, 0.058) 0.116
Product size, branded drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.890 (6.880, 6.900) <0.001
T -0.008 (-0.014, -0.002) 0.009
I 0.000 (-0.018, 0.018) 0.997
Product size, branded drinks, control
(Intercept) 6.513 (6.505, 6.522) <0.001
T -0.003 (-0.008, 0.002) 0.281
I 0.009 (-0.005, 0.023) 0.207
Product size, own-brand drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.443 (6.357, 6.529) <0.001
T -0.058 (-0.093, -0.023) 0.001
I 0.249 (0.129, 0.368) <0.001
Product size, own-brand drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 6.864 (6.815, 6.912) <0.001
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Parameter Effect size 95% confidence 
intervals
p
T 0.034 (0.010, 0.058) 0.006
I -0.157 (-0.232, -0.082) <0.001
Product size, own-brand drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 7.038 (7.025, 7.051) <0.001
T -0.020 (-0.028, -0.012) <0.001
I 0.005 (-0.018, 0.028) 0.661
Product size, own-brand drinks, control
(Intercept) 6.836 (6.827, 6.846) <0.001
T -0.006 (-0.012, -0.001) 0.029
I 0.008 (-0.008, 0.024) 0.351
Number of products, all drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 279.9 (261.5, 298.2) <0.001
T -49.9 (-73.4, -26.4) <0.001
I -26.6 (-48.3, -5.0) 0.019
IT 46.6 (22.3, 70.9) <0.001
Number of products, all drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 299.5 (289.0, 310.0) <0.001
T -7.5 (-13.9, -1.1) 0.025
I -1.2 (-19.7, 17.2) 0.895
Number of products, all drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 2234.7 (2161.0, 2308.4) <0.001
T 30.9 (-14.1, 75.9) 0.184
I -54.3 (-183.7, 75.2) 0.415
Number of products, all drinks, control
(Intercept) 2023.4 (1920.4, 2126.4) <0.001
T 93.5 (-38.5, 225.5) 0.170
I -49.5 (-171.1, 72.1) 0.428
IT -123.0 (-259.6, 13.5) 0.083
Number of products, branded drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 264.9 (248.1, 281.7) <0.001
T -34.9 (-56.4, -13.4) 0.002
I -25.5 (-45.3, -5.6) 0.014
IT 31.9 (9.7, 54.2) 0.007
Number of products, branded drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 272.0 (262.6, 281.4) <0.001
T -7.1 (-12.9, -1.4) 0.018
I 1.7 (-14.8, 18.2) 0.843
Number of products, branded drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 1811.6 (1754.3, 1868.8) <0.001
T 32.3 (-2.6, 67.2) 0.075
I -12.6 (-113.2, 87.9) 0.806
Number of products, branded drinks, control
(Intercept) 1606.6 (1524.1, 1689.0) <0.001
T 86.3 (-19.3, 191.9) 0.114
I -34.7 (-132, 62.6) 0.487
IT -112.4 (-221.7, -3.1) 0.048
Number of products, own-brand drinks, high levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 15.0 (12.9, 17.1) <0.001
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Parameter Effect size 95% confidence 
intervals
p
T -15.0 (-17.7, -12.3) <0.001
I -1.2 (-3.7, 1.3) 0.352
IT 14.7 (11.9, 17.5) <0.001
Number of products, own-brand drinks, low levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 24.2 (21.2, 27.2) <0.001
T -5.2 (-9.1, -1.4) 0.01
I -0.2 (-3.7, 3.4) 0.927
IT 5.2 (1.2, 9.2) 0.014
Number of products, own-brand drinks, no levy category, intervention
(Intercept) 423.1 (402.9, 443.2) <0.001
T -1.4 (-13.7, 10.9) 0.821
I -41.6 (-77.0, -6.3) 0.024
Number of products, own-brand drinks, control
(Intercept) 416.8 (392.6, 441.0) <0.001
T 7.2 (-23.8, 38.2) 0.652
I -14.8 (-43.3, 13.8) 0.315
IT -10.7 (-42.8, 21.4) 0.517
17 
S5 Pre-published protocol 
The protocol for the full evaluation of the SDIL is available online here: https://njl-
admin.nihr.ac.uk/document/download/2010886
The section relevant to the analyses reported in this paper is reproduced here. 
Study 1a: the impact of the SDIL on non-alcoholic drinks market diversity, total sugar content 
and price 
Study design 
Using an in-house dataset collected from major UK supermarket websites, we will use 
interrupted time series (ITS) methods to study whether the implementation of the SDIL was 
associated with changes in level or trend of non-alcoholic drink market diversity, sugar content 
and price.  
Data source 
We will use an in-house, bespoke dataset (developed during our formative work) to assess non-
alcoholic drink market diversification, formulation and price. We have developed automated 
data collection techniques (i.e. ‘data scraping’) and will use these to collect monthly, time-
stamped data on all soft drinks available for purchase from six online UK supermarkets (Tesco, 
Morrison’s, Asda, Sainsbury’s, Waitrose and Ocado). Together these supermarkets (online and 
in-store) represent more than 75% of the UK grocery market.43 The resultant database (FoodDB) 
contains data on the complete product range of soft drinks from each supermarket in each 
month.  
We will add data from any new online supermarkets that open during the project. Maintenance 
of FoodDB will be conducted monthly to ensure that the source code that supplies the dataset 
continues to run appropriately (it also will be necessary to adapt this source code when online 
supermarkets change their appearance, format or layout).  
For each drink we will continue to collect: date of data collection; nutritional content; price; 
pack size; serving size; whether or not the drink is on promotion; and manufacturer. Complete 
datasets for all drinks were collected in December 2013 and October 2016. Data from 1281 
Tesco drinks were collected from 2011 to 2016 using a combination of live and archived 
websites, 391 of which have more than three time points at which data was available. Full 
monthly data on all drinks from all six major online supermarkets is available from October 
2016.  
Outcome measures 
We will have three outcome measures, one related to each of market diversity, formulation and 
price:  
• number of products (e.g. Coca-Cola, not Coca-Cola 500ml bottle) available across six online 
supermarkets per month (market diversity)  
• mean total sugar concentration in g/100ml per month (formulation)  
• mean price (not sales-weighted) in £/100ml per month (price)   
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These will be considered overall and in each of the four drinks categories described above 
separately.  
Study period and sample size 
As described above we have some FoodDB data from 2013, with full data available from 
October 2016. This study will, therefore, include data from October 2016 (6 months after 
intervention announcement) – April 2020 (2 years after intervention implementation).  
Data are available per calendar month, thus providing 12 time points/year from full 
establishment of FoodDB onwards (October 2016), and a total of 42 time points in the study. 
Currently, we estimate that more than 1000 unique soft drinks products will be included per 
time point. This dataset therefore substantially exceeds current recommendations for minimum 
samples sizes for ITS analyses of at least 10 time points before and after the intervention, and at 
least 100 observations per time point.  
Data analysis 
We will conduct single time point, ITS analyses for each outcome overall in each of the four 
drinks categories described above separately. The unit of analysis will be the calendar month. As 
data is only available from after intervention announcement to after intervention 
implementation, we will include only one ‘intervention’ point – intervention implementation.  
As FoodDB is a database of products, rather than purchases or consumption, it will not be 
possible to study any differences by socio-demographic characteristics of purchases or 
consumers. Additional analyses stratified by supermarket price point may be possible e.g. as a 
student project add-on.


